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FINAL REPORT ON THE
DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP
Held At The
San Juan Capistrano Research Institute
April 13-15, 1993
I, OVERVIEW:
The Discovery Management Workshop (DMW) was chartered by Dr. Wesley T.
Huntress, Director, Solar System Exploration Division (SSED), on February 1, 1993 to
"consider management aspects of the Discovery Program, particularly the roles and
relationships of the Principal Investigator and his or her institution, any industrial partner, any
NASA Center I involved, and NASA Headquarters". The approach was to solicit the
participation of two dozen experienced space program scientists, engineers, and managers from
a wide spectrum of organizations and perspectives for a concentrated 3-day, focused, informal,
and candid series of presentations and discussions. Attendance was by invitation only. An
informal, "Executive Committee" consisting of F. A. Cart, J. S. Martin, and W. E. (Gene)
Giberson was asked to plan and conduct the workshop in consultation with Dr. C. Pilcher,
SSED. The DMW was held April 13-15, 1993, at the San Juan Capistrano Research Institute,
ably supported by its Director, Doug Nash.
Because of the diverse familiarity of the participants with the Discovery Program, a
package of background information was provided to them a month in advance. The workshop
agenda was arranged to first bring everyone up to a common understanding by spending the
first half-day receiving presentations from Dr. Carl Pilcher regarding the Discovery Program
Goals and Objectives, and twO speakers presenting "lessons learned" from SDIO-sponsored
flight projects. (Unfortunately, GSFC was not able to attend to present their lessons-learned
from the successful SMEX program.) A separate Subpanel, composed entirely of industry
representatives and organized at the request of the Executive Committee by A1 Schallenmuller
of the Martin Company had met the previous week to discuss the same general Discovery topics
IJPL b considered a NASA Center in thb report
and issues and the results from that Subpanel were presented. The 30-some DMW participants
then assembled into two Subpanels, chaired by Jim Martin and Gene Giberson, and spent
nearly two full days discussing and debating factors and issues generally associated with a)
"The Up front Process" (usually called pre-Phase A, Phase A & Phase B), and b) "The
Implementation Phase" (Phase C/D). Much of the final day was focused on the reports of each
Subpanel which were presented in Vu Graph format to the full set of DMW participants.
Following the Workshop, the "Executive Committee" met for two days to consolidate
the findings of the two Subpanels, many of which overlapped a good deal. A draft was
forwarded to each participant for review and comment the results of which have been factored
into the report that follows herein.
While the intended diversity of perspectives produced the predictable diversity of views
among the Workshop participants,
it is unmistakably clear that everyone unanimously and enthusiastically
supports the Discovery concept and its goals; the notion of
accomplishing valuable solar system exploration science in a faster,
better, cheaper mode is seen by the Workshop participants as not only
exc_'ng, but reah'stic and achievable as well.
SUMMARY OF "THE DISCOVERY PROGRAM"
(as Presented by C. Pilcher)
"Discovery" is a series of low cost, planetary missions, with focused science objectives, and
• Limited to $150M development cost each, ELV of Delta II or smaller
• Level of effort @ - $85M/yr analogous to the "Explorer" Program
• MESUR Pathfinder and NEAR are current Phase A studies; subsequent Discovery
missions axe the subject of this workshop.
Goals of Discovery are to
• Increase flight rate and launch schedule certainty
• Complement larger, less frequent missions
• Increase involvement of Industry, Universities, & Students, and, public awareness in
planetary missions
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Current planning envisions...
• On-going advance mission concept studies
• A maximum 1-year AO process
• A definition phase, 1-2 years, for 3 Mission Concepts, and a down selection
• A development phase not to exceed 36 months
NASA Objectives for this Workshop
• Further development of management approaches and concepts
• Review of the Discovery Program Handbook
• Exploration of relationships between various "players" in a Discovery mission
2, LIST OF KEY FINDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP:
• The concept, goals and objectives of Discovery (NTE $150M, 3-year development)
are terrific and achievable
• Discovery should aim for one start and one launch per year, on-going
• Headquarters should not attempt to manage the Program alone
• A contract management and technical "oversight" office is needed.
• Most PI's will not wish to be "Project Manager" of their mission
• A few PI's do not wish to team with a NASA Center
• Most PI's will favor roles as mission architect and science leader.
• Most Universities have neither the will nor the means to accept sole responsibility for
an entire mission.
• Use of "new technology" is supported--within the Discovery boundary conditions.
• The traditional AO process can be improved (quicker and cheaper, just as effective)
• Each bi-annual AO should select 3 missions for short Phase A's, then down-select for
Phase B, and go into development only after criteria are met and reviewed.
• Be prepared to cancel any non-performing mission, in any Phase, A to C/D.
• Performing Criteria: good probability of valid science within cost & schedule
commitments
• Every mission needs a credible: management plan, cost, schedule, & reserves
• Should have a fall back science floor (minimum acceptable objectives & capabilities)
• An approved Project Plan for each mission is a must.
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3. SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF WORKSHOP 2:
Since the Workshop was designed to bring together diverse views from a wide variety of
perspectives, it is not surprising that spirited debate often occurred. Further, one would not
expect that unanimity or even frequent consensus would be achieved, particularly on the
thorniest issues. Having said that, we believe however that the workshop did converge toward
a consensus on a number of points, and there was usually at least a prevailing view on other
points. Unless specified otherwise, we feel that the following findings were the consensus or at
least prevailing views of the Workshop; disagreements, or minority views will be indicated as
such.
A fundamental finding of the Workshop is that the Discovery Program concept and
goals are viable, realistic and rewarding.
3.1 Discovery AO Considerations
To demonstrate initiative and build Discovery momentum, HQ should plan for success
and begin the AO preparation process now, and the entire process, through completion of
selections should be completed in 10 months or less.
Subsequent AO's: to ensure scientific balance, it may be desirable to "customize" the
_thrust" of each subsequent AO; this will also conserve scarce proposal dollars when certain
scientific disciplines or areas are not likely to be high priority targets during a particular 2-year
AO cycle.
The approach should be to retain the traditional strengths of the AO, but to add the rigor
of traditional (spacecraft) RFP's by using two (equal) panels: a technical/management/cost
panel as well as the scientific peer review panel.
The process should include the early issuance of a draft AO for comments. After the
"final" AO is issued and proposals are received, all "unacceptable _ proposals should be
identified and eliminated from further consideration. Those remaining should be evaluated
against criteria that takes management and cost into account on a par with science; finally,
2 Thi_ is an integrated composite of the two DMW Subpanel reports.
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oral discussions and site visits should be considered to ascertain the capabilities of the
Proposers.
Sample AO and Proposal Contents were developed with the goal of streamlining the
process while providing substantive information upon which to intelligently base an evaluation.
A "model" contract might be included as a part of the AO. This would greatly
facilitates NASA's ability to promptly complete negotiations at the conclusion of the selection
process. (The contract should be for Phase A, with negotiated options for Phase B and Phase
C/D.)
While the Discovery mission cap of $150M should be retained, proposers should be
evaluated by taking life cycle costs into account (including pre-Project and MO&DA costs,
Launch and TDA-unique costs, and NASA-supplied ELV costs). Cost guidelines should be
provided in the AO.
3.2 Pre-Project Implementation Plan
An implementation plan was developed and supported almost unanimously by the
participants. Its attributes axe:
• Issue AO's every two years
beginning 9/93
• Provide 7-10 % pre-project
funding
• Supports an annual new-start
rate of 1 beginning FY' 96
• Select -3 proposals for Phase A
• Keep Phase A & B duration
short (e.g. 9 months)
• Authority To Proceed for Phase C/D
based on a Formal Review of
Phase B results
A schedule and first order funding level reaching $14M per year 3 in FY' 95 was
derived, and is shown in Figure A. The Workshop participants strongly endorse this plan as
being aggressive, affordable, and achievable.
3 Excluding development funding
5
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"Definition" and "Preliminary Design" Phases could be performed as illustrated in the
following example:
• Select 3 missions for 9 month Definition Phase (Phase A in this example...Ed..)
• Perform mission design and feasibility, prepare implementation and management
plans, and preliminary cost estimate
• Conclude with a formal HQ review of design, implementation, and cost, for the
purpose of making a continuation decision.. At this point a single team would
proceed into preliminary design phase(i.e., Phase B) of 9-12 months duration, at the
conclusion of which a Mission Design/Phase C/D start/continuation review would
take place
• The Workshop further recommends reviews approximately every year tied to a
proposed critical event such as PDR, CDR, for the purpose of making a
continuation decision.
• To review & assess end-to-end performance (technical, cost, schedule)
• Cancel mission in a timely fashion if no reasonable probability of success
within agreed resources constraints
3.3 Discovery Program Organization
This was a far ranging discussion without final agreement nor consensus regarding a
particular organizational approach for the program. However, the following points were
dearly the prevailing workshop view:
The role of NASA HQ and the Program Manager should be retained basically in its
present form, i.e., HQ should not attempt to enhance the role of the program manager to
provide contract management and technical oversight.
The PI should be responsible for developing an organizational approach (e.g. a teaming
arrangement or "consortium") consisting of one or more groups, as appropriate, from
Universities, NASA Centers, FFRDC's, and Industry, to implement his/her proposed mission.
A NASA Center/JPL "Oversight Office" should exist organizationally between HQ and
the PI's "management consortium"; this "Oversight Office" might be different for each
6
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Discovery Mission (no agreement), but in any event its form and charter would be a HQ
decision. The main point is that HQ cannot contract for or manage each Discovery Mission,
but that NASA should be prepared to provide limited oversight of Discovery Missions (general
agreemen0.
This responsibility for contractual management and technical oversight could be
assigned to JPL or a NASA Center that has an institutional interest in planetary exploration.
Headquarters is responsible for assigning the responsibility for this management and oversight
function, which is a separate and distinct function from any implementation, or mission
management task.
In those cases where a PI elects to team with a NASA Center for Project Management,
as well as with the same Center to be a supplier of a portion of the proposed effort (e.g. to
purchase the spacecraft), the PI should develop an MOU for the Proposal with the Director of
the NASA Center that covers the assignment of responsibilities and allocation of resources.
(Ed. Note: This was a somewhat controversial finding because in effect the PI becomes both a
customer and a vendor relative to the Center.)
Goal: Make Discovery Visible and effective within NASA
Discovery Program Office should be established immediately. (Note that no agreement
was reached about the appropriate level of this office, other than it should be separate and
visible...Ed)
• Provides stability and continuity (i.e., long term nature of program, 10-20 years,
suggests an "institutional" rather than program organization).
• Ensures success in the "Faster, Better, Cheaper" world
* Structure of Program Office:
• Located at HQ, and small, i.e., perhaps 2-6, headed by Program Manager,
possibly recruited from outside NASA
• With broad skills in areas of science, management, engineering, procurement
7
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Roles of HQ Program Office (General agreement on roles but considerable pessimism
regarding success in the HQ environment...Ed.):
• Facilitate interfaces with NASA offices & External Agencies
• Advocate vigorous program of 1 launch per year
• Expedite critical decisions and mission selections
• Establish & maintain stable environment and funding profile and continuity
• Expedite procurement and funding for selected missions
• Oversee development, progress, funding & spending profiles for ongoing missions
• Interact closely with science community--through a small, standing advisory group
3.4 PI Roles/Responsibilities/Relationships
The Workshop found that it now appears that, with a very few exceptions, Universities
are unlikely to be willing to contract for full mission responsibilities in support of their PI's.
The PI is expected to:
• Propose, and implement if selected, a management plan that addresses his/her
mission and the responsibilities of the PI, the Project Manager, and other key
personnel.
• Form a team among a NASA Center, Industry, an FFRDC, and scientists that will
deliver the entire mission,
• Delegate authority as appropriate
• Appoint or concur in the appointment of key personnel
• Approve key documents, budgets, key trade offs, and major expenditures
• Chair the Science Team
• Make appropriate time commitments
8
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• Preserve the Scientific integrity of the mission
• Report to HQ via some (TBD) mechanism
The Workshop saw the role and responsibility of the PI as a crucial factor in the success of
the mission; it must be carefully and thoroughly designed to provide a viable means for the
successful preservation of mission science and the implementation of the mission. Management
continues to be a key consideration.
3.5 Funding By HQ?
Can Missions be funded and managed directly from HQ without the services of a NASA
Center?
• There is no savings associated with a contract managed at Headquarters versus a
Field Center.
• There may be some savings versus contracting from JPL, the "JPL 12% overhead
factor" on procurements being cited as an example.
• HQ should not require that all missions be managed by a NASA Center (Clear lack
of consensus on this point...Ed.)
HQ should find ways of funding PI's directly (Lack of consensus on this point also,
with some vigorous beliefs that it is unrealistic to contract directly from HQ to the
PI's).
3.6 International participation
It was noted that International partnerships can be risky, that the PI should be US,
that NASA should be able to unilaterally terminate the mission, and that
International participation should be less than the NASA participation.
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International Discovery missions should be capped at $150M to NASA and limited to
36 months, a However, those that reduce the mission cost below $150M are
encouraged.
International Discovery missions should be small independent free-flyers and not
large NASA science instruments to be flown on large international platforms or
spacecraft.
3.7 Use of New Technology in the Discovery Program
While mission success is recognized as a high priority...
• Introduction of new technology must be driven by mission objectives
Innovative engineering approaches and use of new technology to enhance the value of
a Discovery mission is encouraged and a new technology emphasis for smaller,
Pegasus-class payloads is supported.
• The use of new and advanced technologies to meet the goals of the Program is
desirable.
In the above cases, the proposal (and Project Plan) must include a risk assessment
and a plan to address the risk. A "fall-back" plan could involve, for example,
reverting to "older" technology, descoped science objectives, mass growth, etc.
• Code C funding should be considered to support new technology for Discovery
missions.
3.8 Risk
Mission success within agreed cost and schedule boundaries must be the overriding
priority. Missions must be designed and scoped to emphasize mission success within cost and
4 A minority view indicated that International proposals could have an unfair advantage under these arrangements, since they could
be scoped at $299.9M thus appearing to be more "attractive" than the capped $150M US proposals.)
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schedule constraints. A mechanism should be in place to permit NASA m quickly cancel a
mission that is not conforming to cost and schedule constraints.
Moderate mission risk can be acceptable, and...
• NASA should avoid the imposition of arbitrary (e.g. parts) requirements
• the PI should plan arid justify his risk approach
RISK applies to cost, schedule and performance parameters
• Only performance is unconstrained by Discovery approach
• Cost and schedule contingency should be proposed and evaluated on the basis of
credibility and risk
• Performance resiliency must be considered
Performance resiliency implies the following considerations:
• A science "Performance Floor" should be required from the PI, below which the
mission is no longer justifiable on scientific and economic grounds.
• Proposal should include prioritized list of measurement objectives constituting the
"Performance Floor', and, above the floor up to "Full Mission Objectives'.
Options for "graceful degradation" should be proposed
A termination review would be triggered ff anticipated performance drops to
the Performance Floor (Note: tentative agreement, pending more definition).
4. KEy POINTS FROM INDUSTRY SUBPANEL of April 6. 1993:
Ed. Note: These views are summarized from the Presentation by A1 SchaUenmuHer who
organized and conducted the Subpanel; because of time constraints, they were not significantly
discussed by the Workshop.
Organization & Management (See Organization Chart, Appendix E):
NASA HQ should:
• Provide interface with the Congress
11
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• Solicit new mission concepts
• Administer the AO process
• Expect to secure help for technical reviews (oversight)
• Note that NASA Centers may have "conflicts of interest"
• May have to hire support contractors, with bid-exclusion provisions
• "Contract" with a "Responsible Organization" for each mission
• limit management and technical oversight to 5-8 people
The "Responsible Organization" could be:
• A University (but often lacks Project Management experience and may have limited
technical resources)
• A NASA Center (but may have unfair advantage; little incentive to control costs,
typically does "business as usual", would require the NASA Administrator to direct
a "New Way of Doing Business').
• Industry (which has infrastructure in place, management strength, a technology base,
and profit incentives for motivating to control costs), or
• A National Laboratory (i.e., an FFRDC).
The Project Management Office...
• is staffed/hired by "Responsible Organization"
• includes Project Manager, PI, admin, support
• procures, administers contracts for instruments, _, GDS,
• obtains network support
• integration (of the project elements)
Assuming one $150M mission per year, the total net funding requirements are calculated to be
$162M/year including the seed money for advanced mission studies, 3 teams for 1 year
definitions at $1m each, plus one team for a second year of definition at $9m. And, the typical
annual development profile should be $30/80/40m.
Risk Reduction contracting requires...
• Well defined requirements with freeze at NAIl
12
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• Pre-NAR invest 7-8% of contract + IR&D from contractors
• Consistent funding profile
• Don't pick fixed price contracts and assume everything will be okay; consider FFP if
really "off-the-shelf".
• Continue to make mission selections on schedule
Contract type considerations...
Favor incentive fee arrangement with split between cost, schedule and mission
success, with easy to interpret incentives, and > 100% of target fee for under-run,
ahead of schedule and greater data return. Sample incentive fee curves provided as
illustrations.
• Not in favor of award fee contracts (too much subjectivity and too much time and
effort to administer), or fixed price (unless development risk is known to be low).
Should PI select spacecraft contractor? (yes)
The "Responsible Organization" of the PI should be responsible for the selection.
Teams formed for proposal, competitive or sole source
NASA has 3 opportunities to evaluate spacecraft contractor:
• During advanced studies
• From AO process
• At down-select, from 3 teams to 1 team
Conduct a minimum of reviews with NASA board restricted to 6-9 members ....
• NAR/System Requirements Review = freeze, sign Project Plan
• PDR (2 days), covering instruments, s/c, GDS plus cost & schedule performance
• CDR (2 days), same scope as PDR
• Launch Readiness (2 days)
New Technology: Introduce, but reduce risk with Up-front money:
• Pre-project funding of $10 million
• Study and Contractor IR&D funds
• Code C Technology development support
13
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Use of Government Specifications and Standards--do not mandate
• Teams should propose what they think makes sense for mission and risk level
• Evaluators should judge accordingly
Mission Selection Criteria should include:
• Science value
• Cost, schedule and technical risk
• Consideration of total life cycle cost
• Accountable milestones to measure progress versus spending
5. KEY POINTS FROM SDIO PROGRAM PIHCA_;ENTERS;
SDIO found it is possible to achieve launch times of 12-18 months from go-ahead and
still follow all procurement regulations, FAR's, etc. For example, programs can place orders
on existing contracts, or utilize sole source procurements often without RFP's, CBD's and
such; also many steps and customs that have developed within the procurement process--and
which take time and add cost--can be eliminated; lastly, a way should be found to have the
Contacting Officer become a team player, working for, rather than against, the program
schedule.
SDIO seeks the tightest weight designs and smallest ELV with standardized payload
interfaces to save cost; they believe that reducing weight reduces cost. The mission is limited
to essentials, latest technology is used.
SDIO missions appear to be performed on the basis of specified cost arid a "flexible"
definition of mission success, since the technology demonstration is the primary project goal.
A centralized, very small Program Office is used; they do not require consensus to make
decisions. They obligate 100% of each FY funding up front to the implementing organization,
do not believe what the PERT charts say but instead visit the development sites (they do not
14
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have travel dollar problems). Another management technique is to constantly focus on ETC
rather than monthly "deltas from plan" because control of the end item cost is the objective.
They exploit quantity parts buys, use commercial grade parts at times to save up to 100
times the cost; they freeze the design early, use some redundancy, resist science enhancements,
and they build engineering units, mass simulators, and engineering spacecraft all of which leads
to design maturity before the flight items are delivered. They do rely on testing, but do not
subject the hardware to excessive test levels.
They sometimes use a "Hardware Acquisition Team", consisting of both technical and
procurement people whose explicit charter is to acquire the hardware. Often they bought what
was available (saving time and dollars) and modified requirements accordingly-a radical
departure from typical requirements-driven hardware designs and buys. In other words, they
avoided "minor mods to improve" what already existed.
15
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DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP
PARTICIPANTS (ALPHABETICAL)
FIRST NAME
Steve
LAST NAME
Bailey
ORGINIZATION
NASA JSC
REPRESENTING
Project Mgmt
Phil Barnett JPL Project Mgmt
Charlie Barth Univ-Colo Science
Steve Barrel Consultant (Battel Engrg) Project Mgmt
Mike Belton Univ-Kitt Peak Science
Bob Bless Univ-Wisconsin Science
AI Boggess Retired-NASA Science
Bill Boynton Univ-Arizona Science
Geoff Briggs NASA Ames Science
Jim Campbell NASA HQ/JPL Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Frank i
Dan
Andrew
Tom
Gary
Charles
Gene
Richard
Carr
Cathcart
Cheng
Coughlin
Coulter
Elachi
Giberson
Goody
Hall
Hubbard
Lowe
Martin
Charlie
Scott
NASA Ret/JPL
NASA Ames
FFRDC-APL
FFRDC-APL
NASA HQ
JPL
Retired-JPL
Univ-Harvard/JPL
Retired-NASA
NASA Ames
Univ-Cornell
NASA Consultant
Jack
Jim
jProject Mgmt
Procurement
Science
Project Mgmt
Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Science
Project Mgmt
Science
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Univ Admin
Project Mgmt
David Morrisroe Univ-CalTech Univ Admin
Doug Nash SJCRI Workshop Host
John Neihoff NASA Support (SAIC) Project Mgmt
Steve Paddack NASA GSFC Project Mgmt
David Paige Univ-UCLA Science
Carl Pilcher NASA HQ Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Don Pinkler NASA HQ Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Connie Poole NASA HQ Procurement
NASA HQ (Q)Buz Sawyer R&QA
Tony Spear JPL Project Mgmt
Rob Staehle JPL Project Mgmt
Alan Steed Univ-Utah State Univ Admin
Randy Taylor JPL Procurement
Joe Veverka Univ-Cornell Science
Richard Vorder Bruegge NASA Support (SAIC) Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Jim Wheeler Univ-Arizona Univ Admin
Page A-1
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP
A'I-I'ENDEES (By Functional Area)
REPRESENTING FIRST NAME
Workshop Host
Univ Admin
Univ Admin
Doug
Jack
David
Univ Admin Alan
Univ Admin Jim
Science Charlie
Science Mike
Science Bob
Science AI
Science Bill
Science Geoff
Science Andrew
Science Charles
Science Richard
Science David
Science Joe
LAST NAME ORGINIZATION
Nash
Lowe
Morrisroe
Steed
:Wheeler
Barth
Belton
Bless
Briggs
Cheng
Elachi
Goody
Paige
Veverka
R&QA Buz Sawyer
Project Mgmt Steve Bailey
Project Mgmt Phil Barnett
SJCRI
Univ-Cornell
Univ-Cal Tech
Univ-Utah State
Univ-Arizona
Univ-Colo
Univ-Kitt Peak
Project Mgmt
Univ-Wisconsin
Boggess Retired-NASA
Boynton Univ-Arizona
NASA Ames
Coughlin
FFRDC-APL
JPL
Univ-Harvard/JPL
Univ-UCLA
Univ-Cornell
NASA HQ (Q)
NASA JSC
JPL
Project Mgmt Steve Battel Consultant (Battel Engrg)
Project Mgmt Frank Carr NASA Ret/JPL
Tom FFRDC-APL
Project Mgmt Gene
Project Mgmt Chadie
Giberson
Hall
Hubbard
Martin
Neihoff
Paddack
Spear
Sco_
Jim
John
Steve
Tony
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Procurement
Procurement
Procurement
Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
Rob Staehle
Dan Cathcart
Retired-JPL
Retired-NASA
NASA Ames
NASA Consultant
NASA Support (SAIC)
NASA GSFC
JPL
JPL
NASA Ames
Gary
Pgm Mgmt (HQ) Carl =
Pgm Mgmt (HQ) Don
Pgm Mgmt (HQ) Richard
Connie Poole NASA HQ
Randy Taylor JPL
Jim Campbell NASA HQ/JPL
Coulter NASA HQ
Pilcher NASA HQ
Pinkler NASA HQ
Vorder BnJegge NASA Support (SAIC)
Page A-2
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP
ATTENDEES (By Orginization Type)
:ORGINIZATION
Consultant (Battel Engrg)
FFRDC-APL
FFRDC-APL
JPL
JPL
JPL
JPL
JPL
NASA Ames
FIRST NAME
Steve
LAST NAME
Barrel
Tom Coughlin
Andrew Cheng
Randy
Phil
Tony
Rob
Chades
Taylor
Barnett
Spear
Staehle
Elachi
REPRESENTING
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Science
Procurement
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
Science
Procurement
Project Mgmt
Science
Project Mgmt
Project Mgmt
NASA Ames
NASA Ames
NASA Consultant
NASA GSFC
Dan
Scott
Geoff
Jim
Steve
Cathcart
Hubbard
Briggs
Martin
Paddack
NASA HQ Gary Coulter Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
NASA HQ Carl' Pilcher Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
NASA HQ Don Pinkler Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
NASA HQ Connie Poole Procurement
NASA HQ (Q) Buz Sawyer R&QA
NASA HQ/JPL Jim Campbell Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
NASA JSC Steve Bailey Project Mgmt
NASA Ret/JPL Frank Cart Project Mgmt
NASA Support (SAIC) Richard! Vorder Bruegge Pgm Mgmt (HQ)
NASA Support (SAIC) John Neihoff Project Mgmt
Retired-JPL Gene Giberson Project Mgmt
Retired-NASA Charlie Hall Project Mgmt
Retired-NASA AI Boggess Science
Doug Nash Workshop Host
Bill Boynton Science
Jim Wheeler Univ Admin
David Morrisroe Univ Admin
Charlie Barth Science
Joe Veverka Science
Jack !Lowe Univ Admin
Richard Goody Science
Mike Belton
David Paige
Science
Science
SJCRI
Univ-Arizona
Univ-Arizona
Univ-Cal Tech
Univ-Colo
Univ-Cornell
Univ-Cornell
Univ-Harvard/JPL
Univ-Kitt Peak
Univ-UCLA
Univ-Utah State
Univ-Wisconsin
Alan Steed Univ Admin
Bob Bless Science
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DAY
Tue
Wed
TIME TOPIC LEAD ALLOTTED NOTES
0800 Welcome Nash 15 min Logistics,
etc.
0815 Workshop Purpose, Carr 15
Goals, & Process
0830 DISCOVERY Program & Pilcher 30
Goals
0900 The GSFC SMEX (Cancelled) 30 What, How
Experience & Views managed, &
lessons
learned
0930 The SDIO Experience Stu Nozette 45 ditto
1015 Kane Casani 30 ditto
1045
1100
The JPL MISTI
Experience
Break
Industry Subpanel
Report
Lunch-Local area
restaurants
Subpanel Sessions #1
Adjourn
1200
Nash
Schallen-
muller
Giberson &
Martin
1300
15
60
60
4 hrs
1700
Two
Locations
1900 Mixer Nash 90 @ SJCRI
0800 Full Panel Tag-up Carr 30 Short Joint
Session
0830 Subpanel Sessions #2 3.5 hrs Two
Locations
Martin &
Giberson
1200 Lunch-local area
1300 Subpanel Sessions #3 Martin &
Giberson
1700 Adjourn
60
4 hrs Two
Locations
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DAY
Thur
TIME TOPIC LEAD ALLOiiED NOTES
0800 Prep of Subpanel Martin & 4 hrs no Joint
Reports & Splinter Giberson Sessions
Sessions as needed
1200 Lunch-local area 60min
1300 Martin 2 hrs
1500
"SubpaneI-A
Presentation-including
discussion and
"Minority Reports", if
any
Break
"Subpanel B
Presentation-including
discussion and
"Minority Reports", if
any
Close
Adjourn
1515
Nash
Giberson
Carr &
Pilcher
1715
15 min
2 hrs
45
1800
Joint
Session
Joint
Session
Joint
Session
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